Hearts, Minds, and Terror: Sanctions Cannot Stop the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Playbook
By Kenzo Hannah, University of Chicago
Germany is currently pushing the European Union to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).[1] The European Union would join the U.S. and several other nations in classifying the organization as such. This article will establish Iranian geopolitical interests, demonstrate the manners in which the Quds Force carries out these interests, rationalize the U.S.’ designation of the IRGC as an FTO, and analyze the effectiveness of that action thus far in reducing terror.
Iran has become adept at using the “gray zone,” a state of covert conflict beneath overt war yet exceeding total peace, to exploit the institutional disadvantages of the United States and its allies and advance their security interests to the detriment of the West. Iran employs networks of proxies and cultivated local militias within politically unstable regions to carry out attacks and project power while maintaining plausible deniability.[2] Iran overcomes a massive conventional military disadvantage by weaponizing this plausible deniability and their ambiguous threshold for casus belli. This ambiguity prevents American decision-makers from effectively organizing retaliatory measures without risking outright warfare.[3] Iran’s high-level aim through these gray zone operations is the expansion of its political and theological sphere of influence rather than direct control of territory;[4] chief among their tools for carrying out such operations is Quds Force (IRGC-QF), a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[5]
Formed in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was founded as a counterbalance to the traditional military, which was aligned with the overthrown Shah. Operating outside of democratic and judiciary processes, the IRGC, also referred to as Pasdaran (the Persian word for “guards”), answered directly to Iran’s supreme leader, the Ayatollah.[6]
The IRGC’s size and responsibilities ballooned during the Iran-Iraq war. No longer the force whose primary function was deterring coups, the IRGC now uses a standard Western military structure and continues to exist parallel to Iran’s armed forces. It is composed of five branches: Ground Forces, Naval Forces, the Air Force, the Basij Paramilitary, and Quds Force.[7] While the traditional military is tasked with the defense of the country, the IRGC has a wide range of duties. The organization was responsible for rigging the 2009 Iranian presidential election as well as putting an end to the subsequent protests.[8] When unrest presents itself, the assignment falls on the IRGC to quell it. The IRGC also runs Iran’s illicit businesses, smuggling, and sanctions-dodging, facilitating a sizable chunk of Iran’s economic activity.[9]
The IRGC Quds Force deals with foreign affairs. Responsible for funding, training, and advising the armed groups that make up the anti-Western “Axis of Resistance,” the IRGC-QF is heavily involved in the Middle East and advances Iran’s security interests.[10] Iran’s playbook is varied; first, for a recent example of their long-term planning, consider Iran’s efforts to assemble militias within Syria.
The Syrian civil war provided the necessary power vacuum for Iran to exert influence and conduct gray zone operations in the state. Years of corruption, repression, and mismanagement by Bashar Al-Assad’s regime came to a head in 2011 when protests grew into the Syrian civil war. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) constituted the initial resistance force attempting to overthrow the Assad Regime. The FSA was unsuccessful, fracturing into several rival coalitions in the face of scant resources and poor military showings.[11] Several Islamist factions, including various splinter groups of Al-Qaeda, received backing from the Gulf states and began to achieve success on the battlefield. A plethora of international backers, including the United States and Russia, have flooded into Syria since, throwing varying levels of support to opposing sides.[12] The regional turmoil gave space to the Quds Force to begin operations within Syria.
The Quds Force operates by covertly training and supplying local militias to project power over Syria. Each Iranian intervention is delegated to a distinct IRGC-QF commander. In the case of Syria, responsibility falls to Commander Khalil Zahedi. IRGC-QF discloses minimal information on Zahedi. They present no photographs of him and withhold all other information pertaining to his identity.[13] Such secrecy is characteristic of the Syrian operation. On the ground, access to personnel information is also restricted strictly to those who need it. Iranian media never reports on the forces within Syria.[14] Troop movements occur discreetly (in pilgrims’ buses, unmarked vehicles, and disguised as disaster relief workers, to name a few methods).[15] Such secrecy forces Western Intelligence to derive IRGC presence through intensive cross-referencing of local testimony.[16]
The process of cultivating militias is intensely local. Lower-level officers organize operations on the ground within Syria, facilitating the creation of civilian militias similar to Iran’s own Basij, while higher-level officials manage logistics, creating supply lines to ensure fighters have access to fuel and munitions.[17] Over a decade of working in Syria has granted IRGC-QF field officers intricate knowledge of societal dynamics and local power structures. IRGC-QF affords a large amount of discretionary power to these officers, permitting them to leverage knowledge (e.g., knowing a respected local figure whose endorsement is important for opening a recruitment office) to make strong decisions when it comes to structuring the projects.[18] They pay Syrians monthly wages to join militias and provide services such as health care and housing.[19] They further ingratiate themselves within society by providing disaster relief in the light of recent tragedies within Syria.[20]
Through these tactics, IRGC-QF has in Syria assembled an estimated 70,000 Syrians into ~82 fighting units whose origins and connections to Iran are kept intentionally murky. These militias are constantly being created, dissolved, and renamed, making tracking difficult. IRGC-QF employs “façade” groups to further cloud the picture.[21] As counterterror analyst Pierre Boussel puts it in his examination of IRGC-QF conduct, “the Iranian tactic is to make its activities in Syria so opaque that only a handful of specialists and analysts can accurately track them.”[22]
These small militias are used to carry out surprise attacks upon American positions.[23] Such attacks are both hard to foresee and hard to trace back to their source, maintaining the plausible deniability Iran needs to ward off effective American response to its gray zone activities. Between 2020 and March of 2023, 83 attacks took place against the approximately 900 Americans stationed in Syria,[24] projecting Iranian power in the region. As the IRGC-QF progresses to southern Syria, the freedom of movement gained through Iraq and Syria would provide access to the Golan Heights. Control of this territory offers Iran the option to establish a new front with Israel and offers them more strategic flexibility in the event of a larger conflict.[25] The local militias also allow Iran to spread theological and political influence, as well as transport weapons to other members of the Axis of Resistance. Finally, Iran has been working directly to restore 250 Syrian schools and is granting “free access to an Islamic library network and digital training to help develop an Iranian ‘virtually unified nation’ from southern Lebanon through Iraq, Syria, and Gaza.”[26]
Iranian intervention in Lebanon also stands as a strong example of the nation’s long-term planning and use of gray zone operations. Hezbollah, the “A-Team of terrorists” to Al-Qaeda’s B-Team, according to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, has carried out deadly attacks against Americans since its inception.[27] In a 1984 suicide attack, Hezbollah caused over 250 American casualties, prompting the U.S. to withdraw from Lebanon.[28] Hezbollah has remained a thorn in the US’ side ever since, opposing America and our allies.[29] Unlike the Syrian militias, Iran likely no longer exerts direct control over Hezbollah. Instead, it has granted considerable resources to the organization, exerting heavy influence early and ultimately cultivating a strong faction that advances Iranian interests within Lebanon.
During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah, part of AMAL (a Shi’a organization established in 1975 during the lead-up to the Lebanese civil war), seceded in response to leadership commanding the militia to stand by during the Israeli advance.[30] The initial response to the advance was disorganized: many Shi’a militias fought independently while other Shi’a welcomed the advance, viewing it as liberation from the control of dominant Palestinian militias, which left the Shi’a underrepresented within politics.[31]
Iranian influence unified the Shi’a front. The Iranian government, by renting adjoining Syrian-controlled territory for nine million barrels of oil annually, provided Hezbollah’s leadership safe haven, allowing them to plan the organization’s operations in peace and giving the resistance a place to coalesce.[32] In the Bekaa Valley, where the resistance resided, Iran deployed 5000 members of the IRGC initially to train the resistance and manage Hezbollah’s resources. Seeing that Hezbollah had the backing of the Ian, other elements of the fractured Shi’a resistance groups rapidly joined, forming a unified militia and allowing for desperately needed strategic coordination.[33] The factions agreed upon a founding platform, the “Manifesto of the Nine,” which, among other things, “called for jihad against Israel, emphasized Islam as the movement’s organizing principle and declared the signatories’ adherence to the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (rule of the supreme jurist) which accords supreme temporal authority to an Iranian cleric.”[34] The resulting unified Shi’a militia had strong financial backing (approximately $140 million annually from Iran), an external body, and an Iranian Ayatollah with supreme authority to resolve internal disputes.[35] It was—and is—far more capable and frightening than it would have been without Iranian backing.
Iran guaranteeing steady funding allowed Hezbollah to pursue long-term strategies to win over the Lebanese people. They established welfare programs and government institutions, as well as a Martyr fund to pay the family members of those who died while fighting for Hezbollah.[36] The “hearts and minds” campaign secured the allegiance of most of the Lebanese Shi’a. Such a campaign would have proved impossible without the financial backing of the Iranian state.[37]
Iran’s political and financial backing initially gave it substantial control over Hezbollah. While Hezbollah primarily focuses on Israel, Iran has been able on several occasions to add to their list of targets, requesting suicide attacks against the American and French forces in 1983 and several other enemies.[38] The IRGC also collaborated with Hezbollah to conduct operations during the Lebanese hostage crisis.[39] Modern Iranian control is murkier: Hezbollah proclaimed in 2005 that it has “substantial independence at a practical level.”[40] Even absent direct control, Iran’s goals have been achieved.[41] When funded, Hezbollah carries out attacks against their shared enemies, allowing Iran to erode Western positions while maintaining plausible deniability. The IRGC-QF, as of 2021, continues to provide weaponry, training, and substantial funds to Hezbollah, which it has used in support of al-Assad in alignment with Iran’s interests within Syria, as to kill and displace Israelis.[42] Iran has taken advantage of the gray zone in many of these situations, avoiding direct retaliation by obfuscating responsibility and preying upon the US’ desire to avoid war.[43]
As a part of its “maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian regime,” the Department of State declared the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2019. They emphasized that this measure would help “increase financial pressure and raise the costs on the Iranian regime for its support of terrorist activities until Tehran abandons this unacceptable behavior.”[44]
The Department of State’s press release gave several reasons for declaring the IRGC an FTO, including harm to its international reputation. The U.S. already had in place strong measures against the Iranian regime and those connected to it. Iran was designated a State Sponsor of Terror in 1984, disqualifying the nation from exports with any military application.[45] Separately, the U.S. enforced hundreds of sanctions against individuals within the regime, including members of the IRGC.[46] The FTO designation, however, “shines a spotlight on those in the IRGC who engage in terrorist activities” and “sends a clear message to the world.”[47]
The FTO designation also allowed access to the powers granted under Executive Order 13224. Signed in the wake of September 11th by President Bush, the Order allows for the assessment of civil or criminal penalties against those attempting to transact directly with or in any way that benefits the designated FTO.[48] A tool to starve FTOs of resources, the Order enables authorities to collapse the sprawling web of “subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates” leveraged by many terror organizations.[49]
Are Sanctions Reducing Terror?
The sanctions the U.S. imposes upon Iran are ill-suited to combating the Quds Force. The IRGC is unique among State Department-designated FTOs: it is an arm of a functioning state’s military and, as such, receives regular annual funding. Most groups on the list of FTOs are rebel groups scrapping for local geopolitical control rather than organized components of a state.[50] Sanctions and threats of criminal penalties against associates squeeze most FTOs; however, Iran’s budgeting for IRGC-QF cannot be quashed by the powers in the Order.
The IRGC-QF gray zone operations in Syria employ forms of asymmetrical warfare reliant on elements of stealth and surprise not easily mitigated by sanctions.[51] Preventing imports with military applications pinches the level of technology usable by Iran’s Guards. IRGC-QF’s gray zone operations, however, are resilient to this effect of sanctions as their strength has little to do with the quality of weapons at their disposal. Iranian companies domestically produce many weapons used by the Guards. Others are stolen or purchased.[52] It is the complexity and surreptitious nature of Iran’s Syrian operation, not the availability of the latest fighter jets, which enables Iran’s power projection. The U.S. is interested in maintaining peace, avoiding upsetting the other oil-rich Gulf states as well as the Iraq-scarred American people. Iran knows this and pushes American reluctance to its limit. Hezbollah similarly effects their aims without advanced weaponry, attaining Iranian, Russian, and Chinese rockets from Iran (enabled by freedom of movement gained in the Syrian operation).[53] Other weapons like drones and IEDs are produced domestically with ease.[54] Outclassing opponents technologically is America’s domain, not the IRGC-QF’s.
While Iran’s economy has been struggling as of late, at least in part due to economic sanctions, the nation has not been forced to reduce the IRGC’s funding.[55] IRGC’s 2020 budget was $2.3 billion, nearly a third of the nation’s defense budget.[56] The Guards’ slice has only grown since. The IRGC also likely subsists off massive funding from various other legal and illicit sources.[57] Some have argued that sanctions have only increased the volume of illicit activities, further concentrating Iranian power within the IRGC. All in all, the IRGC still has substantial funds at its disposal. While it is unclear exactly how the numbers line up, there has been no pronounced decrease in its spending following FTO status being declared. There may be public discontent over the poor economy, which forces Iran to drop terrorism sponsorship from its list of priorities. This point, however, appears far away as the Iranian government has doubled down on its approach publicly.[58]
Cumulatively, Iranian-sponsored terror is still prevalent despite the sanctions. Hezbollah displaced 60,000 Israelis with its rocket attacks in the last year,[59] 83 Syrian attacks were carried out against American troops between 2020 and 2023, and most importantly, Iran retains strong soft power over the region. There is no reason to believe that sanctions have mitigated their influence. Gray zone activities are some of Iran’s most effective tactics, and as such, they will continue to be a fixture of Iranian defense policy.
[1] Jorge Liboreiro. “EU Finds a Way to Label Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as Terrorist Group.” Euro News, October 11, 2024. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/10/11/the-eu-has-found-the-legal-way-to-label-irans-revolutionary-guard-as-terrorist-group.
[2] Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas A. Heras, Kaleigh Thomas, and Jennie Matuschak. “Iran-U.S. Conflict in the Gray Zone.” Countering Iran in the Gray Zone: What the United States Should Learn from Israel’s Operations in Syria. Center for a New American Security, 2020: 2, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24223.4.
[3] Ibid, 2.
[4] Pierre Boussel. “The Quds Force in Syria: Combatants, Units, and Actions.” CTC Sentinal. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2023: 4, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CTC-SENTINEL-062023.pdf
[5] Goldenberg, “Iran-U.S. Conflict in the Gray Zone,” 2.
[6] “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Council on Foreign Relations, November 12, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards
[7] “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Council on Foreign Relations, November 12, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Zachary Laub. “Syria’s Civil War: The Descent Into Horror.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 14, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war
[12] Laub. “Syria’s Civil War: The Descent Into Horror.”
[13] Boussel. “The Quds Force in Syria.” 2.
[14] Ibid, 2.
[15] Ibid, 4.
[16] Ibid, 2.
[17] Ibid, 2.
[18] Boussel. “The Quds Force in Syria.” 3.
[19] Ibid, 4.
[20] Ibid, 4.
[21] Ibid 3.
[22] Ibid, 4.
[23] Ibid 3.
[24] Ibid, 6.
[25] Ibid, 6..
[26] Boussel. “The Quds Force in Syria.” 4.
[27] Bynam, Daniel. “Should Hezbollah Be Next.” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 54. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/byman20031101.pdf.
[28] Ibid, 57.
[29] United States Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism: Iran. (Washington DC, Accessed November 10, 2024). https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/iran/.
[30] Marc R. DeVore. “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship: A Case Study of How State Sponsorship Affects Terrorist Group Decision-Making.” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 4/5 (2012): 92. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26296878.
[31] DeVore. “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship.” 91-92; Bynam. “Should Hezbollah Be Next.” 57.
[32] DeVore. “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship.” 92.
[33] Ibid, 92.
[34] Ibid, 92.
[35] Ibid, 93
[36] Ibid, 93-94.
[37] Ibid, 96.
[38] DeVore. “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship.” 97.
[39] Ibid, 98.
[40] Husseini. “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal.” 810.
[41] Goldenberg. “Iran-U.S. Conflict in the Gray Zone,” 3.
[42] U.S. Department of Defense. Austin: Diplomacy Is Needed to Restore Calm on Israel-Lebanon Border. (Washington DC, 2004). https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3817107/austin-diplomacy-is-needed-to-restore-calm-on-israel-lebanon-border/.
[43] Goldenberg. “Iran-U.S. Conflict in the Gray Zone,” 3.
[44] Office of the Spokesperson. Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Washington, DC: Accessed November 10, 2024. https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-Corps.
[45] Office of the Spokesperson. Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] “Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism.” Code of Federal Regulations, title 3, (2001). https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/.
[49] “Executive Order 13224”
[50] Maryam Alemzadeh. “IRGC and Terrorism-Related Sanctions: Why They Fail, What They Achieve.” Middle East Brief. Crown Center for Middle East Studies. September 2024. https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/meb160.html.
[51] Boussel. “The Quds Force in Syria.” 1.
[52] Ibid, 4.
[53] Goldenberg, “Iran-U.S. Conflict in the Gray Zone,” 3; DeVore “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship.” 95.; “What weapons does Lebanon’s Hezbollah have?” Reuters. September 17, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/
[54] “What weapons does Lebanon’s Hezbollah have?” Reuters. September 17, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/
[55] Josh Lipsky and Alisha Chhangani. “A crack in the BRICS: Iran’s economic challenges take center stage at Russia’s summit.” Atlantic Council, October 22, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/a-crack-in-the-brics-irans-economic-challenges-take-center-stage-at-russias-summit/.
[56] Anant Venkatesh. “Insight report: The sources of Iran’s IRGC’s financial empire and their sustainability in the medium to long term.” Janes. October 9, 2024 https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/post/the-sources-of-iran-irgc-financial-empire-and-their-sustainability-in-the-medium-to-long-term
[57] Venkatesh. “Insight report”
[58] “Iran plans to raise military budget by around 200%, government spokesperson says.” Rueters, October 29, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-raise-military-budget-by-around-200-government-spokesperson-says-2024-10-29/.
[59] U.S. Department of Defense. Austin: Diplomacy Is Needed
