Iran-Tajikistan Relations in the Context of the Greater Iran Socio-cultural Space
By Maria Poltorykhina, University of Chicago
Tajikistan and Iran potential alliance is the alliance of the poorest country in Central Asia and of the most sanctioned country in the world. However, both these countries belong to one of the most ancient and influential world civilizations, Persia.
As Iran's political isolation has grown, it has considered an Eastern orientation, particularly toward Central Asia, as one of its strategic options.[1] Among these countries, Tajikistan, which culturally belongs to the Greater Persian space, is potentially its most desirable ally. At the core of this discourse in Iranian foreign policy is a strong belief that cultural and historical commonalities among the members of the Greater Iranian space, as opposed to the ideological Islamic approach centered on exporting the Islamic Revolution, will better serve the integration of these member states.[2]
In this article, I propose that Tajikistan now stands at a crossroads between two influences: the secular post-Soviet legacy and the Persian cultural sphere. They create significant contradictions within Tajik geopolitical orientation and self-determination. On one hand, Iran's assertive diplomacy aims to draw Tajikistan into a Persian-Islamic political sphere; on the other, religious politics exacerbate divisions, pulling the two countries in different directions. I examine post-independence developments in Tajikistan, focusing on Iran's efforts in cultural diplomacy, the brief rupture in 2015, later developments and the ideological differences shaping the relationship between Tajikistan and Iran.
To provide historical context, Tajiks and Iranians both belong to the Iranian language family. Their closely related languages are often described as dialects of one another. They were part of the same empires until the decline of the Timurid Empire. Their most celebrated shared historical period was during the Samanid Empire, which produced prominent figures such as Ibn Sina and Rudaki.[3]
Tajikistan gained independence from the USSR in 1991, and Iran became the first country to open an embassy there. Shortly afterward, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan, during which the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) attempted to seize power. Although the IRPT did not succeed, the conflict allowed Iran to play a role as a mediator and facilitate peace negotiations. The war ended with a compromise that resulted in the IRPT being included in the parliament.[4]
The outcome of the civil war shaped the relationship between the state and religion in Tajikistan. The country inherited a deeply secularized ruling model from the Soviet Union.[5] In the 2000s, the government consolidated power around Emomali Rahmon, with the majority of parliamentary seats consistently held by the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), which is recognized as a nationalist and secular party. Consequently, the government holds two distinct perspectives on Islam: Traditional Islam, which it supports as part of Tajik social life and culture, and Political Islam, which it views with suspicion as a potential threat to state power.[6]
These two approaches create a fragile balance, as the government fears the emergence of Islam as a political force. This concern has led to the adoption of restrictive laws regulating religious education, attire, practices, mosques, and religious symbols. Simultaneously, the government utilizes the Ulema Council to legitimize its policies and align them with religious principles. Tajikistan's politics regarding Iran will reflect this dynamic.
After the normalization of the situation in Tajikistan, Iran began its cultural diplomacy. Although soft power efforts had existed during the USSR era, such as events dedicated to the Persian language, the context had changed. Throughout the 1990s, Tajikistan and Iran’s perceptions of each other evolved. Initially, during the 1980s and 1990s, Tajikistan viewed Iran as too radical and underdeveloped. However, this perception shifted as Iran achieved economic growth while Tajikistan experienced increasing economic hardships.[7] Iran supported various investment projects, including infrastructure initiatives such as the Anzob Tunnel and the Sangtuda-2 Hydroelectric Plant, which underscored Iran’s economic significance to Tajikistan. While these projects fostered cooperation, they also made it challenging for the Tajik government to ignore the influence of Iran's Islamic-oriented stance on society, heightening fears of cultural and religious infiltration.
In the 2000s, Iran began expanding its cultural influence. First, it strengthened ties with Tajikistan by the establishment of the Persian-Speaking Association. It invested significantly in education to promote the teaching of the Persian alphabet instead of Cyrillic. Through the efforts of charitable organizations, such as the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, additional education programs, and language centers, Iran sought to enhance Tajiks’ familiarity with their "ancestral" alphabet.[8] However, these efforts achieved only mild success, as the overall knowledge of the Persian alphabet in Tajikistan remains low.[9] Moreover, Iran offered higher education quotas for Tajik students in Iranian universities. However, this initiative sparked controversy, as authorities perceived such cultural exchanges as potentially dangerous, fearing that returning Tajik specialists might be overly influenced by Iranian ideology. Additionally, it was alleged that educators in Tajikistan deliberately refrained from informing their students about these programs.[10]
Iran further promoted cultural activities such as festivals and concerts. The relationship was highlighted by the celebration of Nowruz, a non-Muslim holiday common in Central Asia. There were also plans to establish a joint Persian-language TV channel; however, the authorities eventually halted the project, deeming it overly religious and ideological[11]. Therefore, Iranian cultural politics often faced hazards due to ideological differences.
As we showed, Tajikistan strives to regulate the influence of Islam on public life. The ideological nature of Iran’s government has resulted in actions that Tajikistan perceives as interference in its internal affairs, such as promoting Islam and supporting political islam movements. This ideological tension eventually turned into a scandal in 2015.
The fear of Iranian influence led to the deterioration of relations in 2015. In the fall of that year, the IRPT (Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan) was banned in Tajikistan due to alleged ties with ISIS. Although Hassan Rouhani’s government and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were aware of such sensitivities and avoided any contact with the IRPT, revolutionary institutions tied to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the traditional power structure did not share this cautious approach.[12] Shortly afterward, at the end of 2015, the leader of the IRPT, Kabiri, was invited to an Iranian council meeting, where Ayatollah Khamenei met with him.
This event triggered a swift reaction from Tajikistan. The Tajik government issued a protest note and later released an official statement from the Ulema Council (Tajikistan’s religious institution), condemning the invitation and blaming Iran for starting the Civil War of the 1990s.[13] Notably, Rahmon’s government utilized the Ulema, a non-governmental religious institution, to issue a statement emphasizing the hostility of political rivals. This illustrates how the regime leveraged religious sentiment within society to bolster its political agenda. Heated by the domestic anti-Iranian street protests, Tajik delegation confronted Iran on the level of international organizations, such as SCO, when Tajikistan vetoed its accession. In response, officials in Tehran accused the National Bank of Tajikistan of laundering money for an Iranian oligarch who had been sentenced to death. However, this accusation was later confirmed to be false. During a public meeting, the Tajik leader did not directly name Iran, instead using the euphemism "a so-called friendly country." He made this remark in the context of condemning members of the IRPT, who, according to him, "all without exception converted to Shi'ism.[14] This claim reinforced the Tajik government's narrative of the IRPT being an extension of Iranian influence. The direct attack on Iranian beliefs threatened to destroy Tajik-Iranian relationships.
At the same time, the scandal led to new developments in Tajikistan foreign policy. The mention of Shi’ism did not appear accidental, as Tajikistan later improved its relations with Saudi Arabia, meeting with its representatives in 2018. While no significant long-term economic projects were developed, investment opportunities were discussed, alongside mutual cultural exchanges.[15] However, this does not indicate that Tajikistan is committed to Sunni Islam. Despite its relations with Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan maintains friendly ties with Israel, the USA, Russia, and China. Tajikistan's weak economic position compels the Rahmon government to diversify its geopolitical partnerships. Therefore, Rahmon's statement about Shi’ism should not be seen as an ideological declaration but rather as another example of using religion to reinforce political strategies.
Tajik pragmatism in geopolitics explains why, despite past tensions, Rahmon paid an official visit to Iran in 2019. Previously, such visits had been a source of criticism, particularly during Ahmadinejad’s tenure. His outspoken criticism of Israel and the United States during state visits created discomfort for Tajik officials, who preferred to avoid entanglement in Iran’s geopolitical conflicts[16]. However, under Rouhani’s government, Iran adopted a more cautious approach and refrained from interactions with the IRPT. This shift likely reassured Rahmon’s government, which recognized that severing ties with one of its closest partners would be irrational.
In recent years, as Russia, Tajikistan’s main partner, faces international isolation, and the Taliban's position in Afghanistan alongside ISIS terrorism escalates, concerns about security have grown. As a result, Iran and Tajikistan have strengthened their alliance. This was particularly evident in the second half of 2024, with various meetings held to address security issues and promote further cultural and economic cooperation.[17]
Iran, as a country with fewer economic capabilities compared to Russia and China, seeks to strengthen its alliance with Tajikistan through cultural and ideological ties. Tajikistan, divided between its secular and Islamic identities, leverages this balance to advance its political initiatives while ensuring that political Islam influence does not extend too far. Therefore, while the cultural and ideological alliance between Iran and Tajikistan might not appear entirely sincere, it also does not seem to be in danger of ending soon.
[1] Brenton Clark, "Ahmadinejad, Iran, and Foreign Policy Dysfunction in Tajikistan: Iran and Foreign Policy Dysfunction in Tajikistan," Asian Politics & Policy 7, no. 1 (2015): 10–111, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12180.
[2] Hamid Ahmadi, "Iran and Tajikistan: How Culture and Civilization Fade in the Shadow of Politics and the Political," Iran and the Caucasus 23, no. 1 (2019): 105–119, https://doi.org/10.1163/1573384X-20190110
[3] Rashid Abdullo, "Президенты Ирана и таджикско-иранские отношения," Центральная Азия и Кавказ 16, no. 3 (2013): 188–200, https://cyberleninka.ru.
[4] Dastan Aleef, "Identity and Power: The Discursive Transformation of the Former Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan," In Between Peace and Conflict in the East and the West, edited by Anja Mihr. Springer, 2021, 175–193.
[5] Hakim Zainiddinov, "The Changing Relationship of the Secularized State to Religion in Tajikistan." Journal of Church and State 55, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 456–477. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/css051.
[6] Zainiddinov, "The Changing Relationship of the Secularized State to Religion in Tajikistan," 456–477.
[7] Abdullo, "Президенты Ирана и таджикско-иранские отношения," 188–200.
[8] Hamid Ahmadi, "Iran and Tajikistan: How Culture and Civilization Fade in the Shadow of Politics and the Political," Iran and the Caucasus 23, no. 1 (2019): 105–119. https://doi.org/10.1163/1573384X-20190110.
[9] Ahmadi, "Iran and Tajikistan: How Culture and Civilization Fade in the Shadow of Politics and the Political," 105-119.
[10] Ahmadi, "Iran and Tajikistan: How Culture and Civilization Fade in the Shadow of Politics and the Political," 105-119.
[11] Dulloev, Muhammad, "Культурное отношение Республики Таджикистан с исламскими республиками Афганистан, Пакистан и Иран," Vestnik Pedagogicheskogo Universiteta 4, no. 59 (2014): 47–51. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/kulturnoe-otnoshenie-respubliki-tadzhikistan-s-islamskimi-respublikami-afganistan-pakistan-i-iran.
[12] Karimi, Mahdi, "Iran’s Foreign Policy toward Tajikistan: Exploring the Effective Factors," Journal of Eurasian Studies 14, no. 2 (2023): 194-204. https://doi.org/10.1177/18793665221136879.
[13] Парвиз Муллоджанов, "Таджикско-иранские отношения в новых условиях," CABAR, March 30, 2020. https://cabar.asia/ru.
[14] Муллоджанов, "Таджикско-иранские отношения в новых условиях."
[15] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan. "Relations of Tajikistan with Saudi Arabia." https://mfa.tj/en/saudi/view/133/relations-of-tajikistan-with-saudi-arabia.
[16] Clark, "Ahmadinejad, Iran, and Foreign Policy Dysfunction in Tajikistan: Iran and Foreign Policy Dysfunction in Tajikistan," 10–111.
[17] "Iran-Tajikistan Ties Rooted in Deep History." Tehran Times (Iran), September 25, 2024. https://www.tehrantimes.com.
